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Abstract
Sustainability science seeks to extend scientific investigation into domains characterized by a distinct problem-solving agenda, 
physical and social complexity, and complex moral and ethical landscapes. In this endeavor, it arguably pushes scientific 
investigation beyond its usual comfort zones, raising fundamental issues about how best to structure such investigation. Phi-
losophers of science have long scrutinized the structure of science and scientific practices, and the conditions under which 
they operate effectively. We propose a critical engagement between sustainability scientists and philosophers of science with 
respect to how to engage in scientific activity in these complex domains. We identify specific issues philosophers of science 
raise concerning current sustainability science and the contributions philosophers can make to resolving them. In conclusion, 
we reflect on the steps philosophers of science could take to advance sustainability science.
Keywords Philosophy of science · Values in science · Interdisciplinarity · Transdisciplinarity · Methodology of 
sustainability science
Introduction
Sustainability science is a novel field of research in many 
respects. Its practical orientation, transformational ambi-
tions, and inter- and transdisciplinary core require the 
reconfiguring of both the way science is organized and the 
relationship between science and practice (Clark and Dick-
son 2003; Kates 2011; Jerneck et al. 2011; Bettencourt and 
Kaur 2011). When combined with the ethical dimensions 
of sustainability, this raises many serious philosophical 
concerns. Sustainability scientists have been hard at work 
in recent years developing conceptual resources and novel 
methodologies to address these concerns (Adler et al. 2018; 
Caniglia et al. 2017; Clapp 2018; Livoreil et al. 2017; Nel-
son and Vucetich 2012; Lang et al. 2012), and philosophers 
of science have long been posing similar questions about sci-
entific methodology (Winsberg 2018; Cartwright and Hardie 
2012), the appropriate role of science in society (Longino 
1990; Mitchell 2009), and the various ethical and epistemic 
issues that arise in scientific practice (Douglas 2009; Steel 
2015; Koskinen and Rolin 2019). Moreover, much contem-
porary philosophy of science is a continuation of science 
proper, as philosophers have begun to engage directly with 
the same theoretical questions that scientists ask (e.g. Davis 
et al. 2018). Accordingly, our claim here is that philoso-
phers of science are uniquely positioned to contribute to the 
development and soundness of sustainability science, both 
from an outsider perspective and in partnership with sustain-
ability scientists. A critical viewpoint from the philosophy 
of science could promote the further development of many 
theoretical discussions in sustainability science on one hand, 
while on the other, collaborative efforts could help to focus 
philosophical work on specific issues in the field. Collabo-
rative efforts such as these have been endorsed by several 
academic units, including the School of Sustainability at 
Arizona State University, the Helsinki Institute of Sustain-
ability Science at the University of Helsinki, and Purdue 
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University’s Center for the Environment, all of which have 
hired philosophers of science (including some of us) to col-
laborate with sustainability scientists.
In the following, we identify three salient areas in which 
philosophers of science can readily facilitate theoretical, 
methodological, and ethical progress in sustainability sci-
ence: (1) epistemological issues, (2) conceptual questions, 
and (3) the role of values. What we offer under these head-
ings, however, is by no means an exhaustive or comprehen-
sive account of all the ways in which philosophers could 
contribute to tackling the problems of sustainability sci-
ence.1 We merely provide a sample selected to illustrate 
the general potential for such contributions. Our objective 
is to initiate a mutually enriching conversation between 
philosophers of science and sustainability scientists, thus 
responding to recent calls from the latter for more inclusive 
engagement with the humanities and social sciences (e.g. 
Hulme 2011; Jetzkowitz et al. 2018; Laplane et al. 2019; 
Díaz-Reviriego 2019).
What is sustainability science?
Given that neither the outer boundary nor the inner core 
of sustainability science has completely settled or solidi-
fied, we do not wish to impose any definitions on develop-
ing practices. However, it would be useful to give a broad 
characterization of the field to focus our discussion. Sustain-
ability has a long and varied intellectual history (Caradonna 
2014). Sustainability science, on the other hand, grew out of 
the concerns—most famously expressed in the 1987 World 
Commission on Environment and Development report Our 
Common Future (Brundtland 1987)—with tensions between 
balancing the needs of present generations with those of 
future generations without disrupting the life-support system 
of the planet (Shahadu 2016). As a proper field, it emerged 
only in the early 2000s (Bettencourt and Kaur 2011; see 
also Kates et al. 2001; Clark and Dickson 2003; Komiyama 
and Takeuchi 2006). Kates et al. (2001) is a starting point 
of sorts, and was perhaps the first attempt at giving the field 
both a name and a more tangible direction.
From early on, sustainability science has been character-
ized as a field devoted to studying—and ultimately trans-
forming—the way human societies interact with and depend 
upon the natural environment (Kates et al. 2001; Kates 2011; 
Komiyama and Takeuchi 2006; Balvanera et al. 2017). Argu-
ably, its roots lie in ecological economics, which focuses on 
integrative theorizing of human-nature or economy–ecology 
relationships (Costanza 2019) and has been defined broadly 
as “the science and management of sustainability” (Cos-
tanza 1991).2 Although ecological economics has much in 
common with sustainability science, it is the latter that has 
made an unequivocal turn toward participatory democratic 
processes in knowledge production, notably inter- and trans-
disciplinarity, participatory experimentation, and practice-
based research (Norström et al. 2020).
Two themes of sustainability science have persisted in 
the course of its development, although the emphasis has 
changed over time. The first theme concerns the dynam-
ics of complex systems, the epistemological limitations and 
constraints such systems impose, and the wider implications 
for both science and practical decision-making (Kates et al. 
2001; Clark et al. 2016; Ostrom et al. 2007). Early attempts 
at characterizing the field, such as Kates et al. (2001) (see 
also Kates 2011), emphasize the need for better models and 
modelling approaches to handle the complexity of targeted 
human-natural systems. This has changed, to some extent, 
to focus on ‘genuine’—or at least more pluralistic—interdis-
ciplinarity, and finding the means for making sustainability 
science a more inclusive project that incorporates the social 
sciences and the humanities to a greater extent (Ness 2013; 
Isgren et al. 2017; Jerneck and Olsson 2020).
The second theme concerns the role of transformation and 
(social) change, and the role sustainability scientists should 
play in their promotion. Sustainability science needs to be 
tightly coupled to decision- and policy-making processes, 
rather than being merely “curiosity-driven” (Spangenberg 
2011; Clark and Dickson 2003). Although broadly speak-
ing, the centrality of this aim has been recognized from 
the beginning (Kates et al. 2001), many alternative ways 
of framing the concept have been proposed. Sustainability 
science has thus been thought of as a problem- or solution-
oriented science (Clark 2007; Miller et al. 2014; Jerneck and 
Olsson 2020) focused on the usefulness of the knowledge 
it produces (Clark et al. 2016), an applied science (Ostrom 
et al. 2007), an action-oriented science (Spangenberg 2011; 
Cash et al. 2003; Fazey et al. 2018), and a trans-disciplinary 
venture (Huutoniemi and Tapio 2014; Lang et al. 2012; 
Wiek et al. 2012) that achieves transformation through the 
1 For example, ontology is a salient area of sustainability science to 
which philosophers can contribute but we do not discuss it in this 
paper (but see “Conceptual work for sustainability science” below). 
In fact, recent debates on process ontologies in sustainability sci-
ence (e.g. Hertz et al. 2020) draw heavily on the philosophy of biol-
ogy (Nicholson and Dupré 2018). Social ontology is also relevant to 
sustainability science, in particular the performative and constructive 
functions of scientific models at the science-policy interface, as well 
as in the co-production of knowledge and governance, which phi-
losophers and sociologists of science have discussed in some detail 
(MacKenzie et al. 2007; Zeiss and Van Egmond 2010 and references 
therein).
2 The International Society for Ecological Economics published the 
inaugural issue of the journal Ecological Economics in 1989.
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deep involvement of stakeholders and relevant constituencies 
in the research process.
These two themes are subject to considerable discussion 
and engagement within sustainability science, and they 
touch a range of concerns—methodological, epistemologi-
cal, practical, and conceptual—that are fundamentally philo-
sophical in nature. This motivates and provides an opportu-
nity for deeper engagement and exchange between the two 
fields. In what follows, we outline three main areas in which 
we see particular opportunities for such exchange. They are: 
(1) epistemological issues, including methodology, inter- 
and trans-disciplinarity, and the science-policy interface, 
(2) conceptual work and analysis, and (3) normativity and 
values in sustainability science.
Epistemological issues: methodology, inter‑ 
and trans‑disciplinarity, and science policy
Epistemology in general concerns the justification and truth 
of beliefs. The philosophy of science focuses principally on 
scientific knowledge, but including the processes and con-
ditions of knowledge production and application. The lat-
ter range from specific research methods, relations between 
scientific disciplines, and broader contexts in which science 
as an activity takes place. In this section, we discuss these 
matters in turn.
Rethinking the scope and character 
of methodologies in sustainability science
Sustainability scientists have recently started discussing a 
range of methodological issues, including the transferabil-
ity of case-based transdisciplinary knowledge (Adler et al. 
2018), the taxonomy of experimentation (Caniglia et al. 
2017), evidence synthesis (Livoreil et al. 2017), and the 
synthesis of scientific and non-scientific knowledge such 
as indigeneous knowledge (Tengö et al. 2017). These all 
revolve around the question of how to produce knowledge 
that is both epistemically reliable and practically usable. 
Philosophers of science have been working on these meth-
odological questions for decades, scrutinizing scientific 
methods of theorizing, modelling, and evidential reasoning. 
Contemporary philosophers of science typically approach 
these problems by analyzing well-documented cases or epi-
sodes from mature disciplines such as biology, economics, 
and cognitive science, attempting thereby to extract some 
general methodological lessons. On the other hand, sus-
tainability scientists face an urgent need to develop some 
frameworks or heuristics to organize and guide heterogene-
ous practices in their own field. As a result, typological and 
taxonomical frameworks proliferate, often with no critical 
examination or justification of how they generate reliable 
and usable knowledge. With this unique situation in mind, 
we suggest that the philosophy of science could comple-
ment efforts to develop the methodology of sustainability 
science. Sustainability scientists are already drawing on the 
philosophical literature: Adler et al. (2018) cite Cartwright 
(2012) and Cartwright and Hardie (2012) to argue against 
taking randomized controlled trials as the gold standard for 
producing evidence for public policy, for example, whereas 
Caniglia et al. (2017) cite Mitchell (2009) to argue against 
context- and value-free ideals of science. However, such 
contributions could be more substantial and constructive.
To give an example, Adler et al. (2018) case for ana-
logical reasoning could be further developed by building 
on existing methodological debates on external validity and 
extrapolation. Adler et al. propose using argument by anal-
ogy as a means of transferring substantive knowledge from 
one transdisciplinary study to another. It is, therefore, cru-
cial to understand whether or not two contexts are similar 
enough to warrant analogical reasoning, but how can one 
be confident that the original context and the new contexts 
are similar enough in relevant ways? If one already knew 
this, would it not make the knowledge transfer redundant? 
This problem, the extrapolator’s circle (Steel 2008), has 
been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature. 
Of the several methodological solutions that have been put 
forward, the most notable are comparative process-tracing 
(Steel 2008) and analogical reasoning (Guala 2005, 2010; 
Steel 2010). Both accounts explicitly formulate inferential 
strategies for operationalizing ‘relevant similarities’ to make 
extrapolation more reliable, and therefore, could be usefully 
applied in the context of extrapolation in sustainability sci-
ence (see e.g. Parker 2010 for climate science). Similarly, 
one could enrich Caniglia et al. (2017) case for value-laden 
and context-dependent sustainability science by engaging 
with the philosophical literature on values in science (see 
“Normativity and values in sustainability science”). Such 
examples also provide an opportunity for philosophers to test 
and develop their analytical tools against some of the unique 
methodological challenges that sustainability science poses.
Inter‑disciplinarity and trans‑disciplinarity
Inter-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary (ID/TD) modes of 
scientific research are widely embraced as the modus oper-
andi of sustainability science. Although there is some disa-
greement and inconsistency with regard to how the concepts 
of transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary research are and 
should be formulated, many scholars, funding agencies and 
others have settled on defining the latter as integrative prob-
lem-solving across university disciplines (Lattuca 2001). 
Integration is not operationally defined in the literature, but 
it is understood as a process of combining methodologies 
or practices through which novel synthesized approaches 
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would emerge (see Huutoniemi et al. 2010). Current dis-
ciplines, it is claimed, do not in themselves have effective 
methodologies for resolving sustainability problems. There 
is thus a need for methodological innovations that transgress 
current epistemic standards and norms within disciplines, 
and thereby force disciplines to aim toward specific, prob-
lem-driven targets. This point serves to rationalize the need 
for problem-solving contexts to have effective ID. Simply 
combining methodologies, or applying them independently 
in the context of a joint research project, is usually consid-
ered a form of “mere” multidisciplinarity, which is deemed 
less effective and efficient than ID in terms of achieving 
satisfactory solutions (but see Mennes 2019).
Transdisciplinarity is usually treated as a variation of 
interdisciplinarity, requiring that integrative interactions fur-
ther include extra-academic stakeholders (Jahn et al. 2012; 
Pohl et al. 2011). As such, the relevant problem-context 
is better able to represent the interests and knowledge of 
stakeholders in the problem, helping the scientific process to 
devise more robust solutions. The literature on sustainability 
science has contributed substantially to the development and 
advocacy of transdisciplinary research, including as a means 
of handling so-called “wicked problems” (Bernstein 2015).
In our view, although plenty of research has been carried 
out to create strategies and plans for doing ID/TD (see Lang 
et al. 2012) or parsing these concepts in terms of taxonomies 
(Klein 2010), some of the basic underlying motivations have 
yet to be properly articulated or tested. Why, for instance, is 
cross-border collaboration such a preferred means for imple-
menting ID, particularly given that much effective inter-
disciplinary innovation has come about without strict col-
laboration (see e.g. Harman and Dietrich 2013)? Arguably, 
ecological economics is a case in point of innovative benefits 
not being bound collaboratively to economists or traditional 
economics. Indeed many positions behind the contemporary 
enthusiasm for both ID and TD, in the science studies and 
elsewhere, seem to reflect views that are not strictly based on 
epistemological argument—having a principally political or 
ideological dimension (Godin 1998; Jacobs 2013)—and/or 
are not sufficiently justified in epistemological terms. More 
specifically, they are not justified with respect to the con-
straints under which effective science happens. Such views 
promote speculative optimism about the potential of these 
integrative forms of ID and TD, which has not been borne 
out in practice to the desired extent (see Yegros-Yegros 
et al. 2015). Some of us have studied the epistemological 
and cognitive issues that arise in interactions between dis-
ciplines, and the ways in which the disciplinary structure 
of science drives the development of interdisciplinarity and 
transdisciplinarity in practice (MacLeod and Nagatsu 2016, 
2018; MacLeod 2018; Thorén and Persson 2013; Thorén and 
Breian 2016; Persson et al. 2018; Koskinen and Mäki 2016). 
These critical analyses ultimately bolster enthusiasm for ID/
TD work by providing a methodological reality check, as 
it were, moving beyond speculative optimism and improv-
ing efficiency. Specifically, they should complement ID/TD 
typologies in sustainability science (Lang et al. 2012; Brandt 
et al. 2013), giving them a better grounding in practice.
Two issues stand out in this regard. First, the discipline-
free ideal championed by some proponents of transdiscipli-
narity in sustainability science (Frodeman 2013; Spangen-
berg 2011), which is often founded on a general commitment 
to the methodology of systems dynamics, underestimates the 
role that disciplinary knowledge and methods should play. It 
is not clear why a discipline-free conceptualization is ideal, 
or how it can produce outcomes superior to a multidiscipli-
nary or interdisciplinary model (Koskinen and Mäki 2016). 
Moreover, given that much current empirical work evolves 
from formal modelling frameworks developed in established 
disciplines (rather than, say, systems dynamics models), 
the discipline-free conceptualization of transdisciplinarity 
seems out of step with how it is commonly practiced.
This leads to the second issue, namely the relationship 
between natural and social science (Philipson et al. 2009). 
Many sustainability scientists consider it critical to over-
come the obstacles generated by the different aims, con-
cepts, norms, and methods that characterize these two broad 
fields. Indeed, some have argued that bringing the natural 
and social sciences together is a necessary precondition for 
their success (Jerneck et al. 2011; Kates et al. 2001). This 
applies to very general differences such as that between the 
goals of interpretation guiding some social sciences and the 
goals of explanation and prediction guiding natural science, 
as well as to more specific differences such as those between 
economics and ecology. Various philosophers have investi-
gated the background assumptions and conceptual and meth-
odological inconsistencies that inhibit efficient interaction 
across these disciplinary boundaries, such as different con-
ceptions of “natural” and “artificial” (DesRoches et al. 2019; 
Inkpen and DesRoches 2019,forthcoming), and diagnosing 
such impediments is at least a first step toward overcom-
ing them. Others have identified methodological options for 
integrating data and concepts across boundaries into formal 
models such as Bayesian Belief Network methods, and these 
methods can be collected and evaluated in terms of their 
capacities to do so (MacLeod and Nagatsu 2018).
If observations such as these are taken into account, 
the hope is that philosophers, in combination with others 
concerned with sustainability, might help to fashion more 
pragmatic approaches to ID and TD that are grounded in 
the affordances and constraints of existing methodologies 
and practices. This, in turn, could foster the formulation of 
norms and policies that incentivize such approaches. For 
example, model-coupling across disciplinary boundaries 
may not achieve fully optimal solutions to sustainability 
problems given the extent to which the coupled models 
1811Sustainability Science (2020) 15:1807–1817 
1 3
rely on disciplinary legacy models. However, it does offer 
the potential for complex accounts of coupled human and 
natural systems to be brought to bear on difficult sustain-
ability problems. Making such couplings function well is a 
substantial computational and mathematical problem, which 
demands its own theoretical work (Voinov and Shugart 
2013). In contrast to most expectations of ID or TD, how-
ever, this work is primarily theoretical and does not directly 
concern a specific sustainability problem. Nevertheless, it is 
inherently interdisciplinary, and arguably should be a target 
of funding policy.
Social epistemology and science policy
As noted above, sustainability and other societal problems 
have been strong drivers of recent policy trends toward fund-
ing problem-driven, interdisciplinary research. In turn, sus-
tainability science has greatly benefited from these recent 
policy trends. However, one needs to ask whether this makes 
sustainability science not only more profitable for those who 
obtain the grants, but also better as a scientific enterprise 
from the epistemic and practical perspectives. Evidence to 
this effect is surprisingly scarce. Meanwhile, some authors 
point out the negative unintended consequences of policy 
shifts toward inter- and transdisciplinarity (e.g. Ash 2019), 
and there is suspicion amongst some scientists that interdis-
ciplinarity produces lower-quality outcomes (Leahey et al. 
2017). It is not yet known how these policy trends affect 
the reliability and relevance of the knowledge produced in 
the long run. Philosophers of science have long recognized 
that the quality of scientific knowledge depends not only 
on individual geniuses but also on the social conditions 
under which science is practiced. Social epistemology is 
an approach in philosophy that focuses on the normative 
study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge and 
practice,3 and on the ways interactions between individuals 
and groups in scientific communities affect the reliability of 
knowledge thus produced (Longino 1990; Kitcher 1993). 
These epistemic agents collaborate to find truths, but they 
also compete for scarce resources such as fame, funding, 
and tenure. Their choices and actions are restricted by rules 
and practices. Accordingly, by tinkering with institutional 
variables, science policy could have a substantial impact 
on the focus and outcomes of science. In recent years, too, 
philosophers of science have increasingly started not only 
to pay attention not only to the social but also to the institu-
tional dimension of scientific knowledge production. This 
has resulted in normative work on how various institutional 
changes and incentives affect scientific results, for example, 
and on the epistemic risks that arise from different funding 
incentives (cf. Reiss and Kitcher 2009; Turner 2019).
The perspective of social epistemology raises several 
questions in sustainability science, some of which relate to 
the epistemic quality of the research. For example, how does 
an emphasis on the practical impact (e.g. solution-orienta-
tion, work with extra-academic partners) affect the reliability 
of the produced knowledge? Is there a trade-off between 
the immediate gain of applicable knowledge and the long-
term development of general theoretical knowledge, which 
might turn out to be valuable later in unexpected domains 
(e.g. evolutionary game theory)? How does the demand for 
interdisciplinary collaboration affect the reliability of tradi-
tional disciplinary norms and standards? How do we strike 
a practical balance when there are trade-offs between ethical 
demands such as inclusiveness, and epistemic demands such 
as predictive accuracy? Other questions concern the future 
of the field. Currently, for instance, sustainability science 
seems to benefit from the trends in science policy, but it is 
known that policy trends change. What happens to sustain-
ability science and the momentum toward methodological 
standardization when sustainability loses its political appeal 
as an organizational principle for science policy? What are 
the risks in allowing science policy to determine a disci-
pline’s course instead of letting it evolve according to more 
endogenous factors? These are some of the most pressing 
questions of social epistemology that sustainability science 
needs to address if it is to outlive current policy trends and 
develop into a mature, epistemically successful field.
Conceptual work for sustainability science
Scrutinizing the meanings and uses of scientific concepts is 
a standard, traditional activity in the philosophy of science. 
This includes analyzing general concepts discussed above, 
such as theory, model, or evidence, in an epistemological 
context, as well as those associated with specific disciplines 
such as species or gene in biology, symmetry in physics, and 
preference in economics. Within cognitive science, even the 
concept of concept has been analyzed extensively. Mean-
while, sustainability scientists draw on abstract concepts 
from a wide range of disciplines, and develop and deploy 
them in new and different contexts in which they may well 
carry different meanings and implications. As a result, 
notions such as adaptive capacity, social-ecological system, 
complex adaptive system, self-organization, Anthropocene, 
ecosystem services, vulnerability, adaptation, complexity 
and resilience—to name a few—all qualify as potentially 
benefiting from philosophical analysis. There are several 
3 Normativity in this context concerns both how best to arrange 
social conditions for robust knowledge (normative epistemology), 
and how to ethically evaluate certain knowledge practice in terms of 
justice, equity, and so on (normative ethics). We focus mainly on the 
former in this section.
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reasons to assume that such a venture could be of use within 
sustainability science.
To begin with, sometimes there is a need to develop bet-
ter, more consistent or precise definitions. This is especially 
true in specific situations and technical contexts, and is par-
ticularly relevant to sustainability science in which concepts 
and terms from different disciplines frequently intersect. 
Among the major issues requiring conceptual clarity are 
the ontological, in other words, basic questions about what 
exists. The concept of resilience is a case in point. As a 
notion, it has been used in a range of disciplines, and draws 
from current usage in ecology, psychology, and economics 
(Thorén 2014,2020). Ontological subtleties have practical 
implications in the present context. What does it mean for a 
complex adaptive system to persist through time? How can 
one distinguish between the adaptation of a system and the 
transformation of one system into another? Conceptual clar-
ity in such matters is crucial for operationalizing phenomena 
effectively, generalizing results, and extracting the correct 
empirical implications from abstract theories and models.
Nevertheless, precise definitions providing necessary and 
sufficient conditions are not always desirable (Strunz 2012; 
see also Thorén 2014; Brandt and Jax 2007). In the context 
of moral psychology, for example, Stich (2018) recently 
argued that the concept of morality did not pick out a natu-
ral kind and that, as a result, decades of work attempting 
to define “morality” in a principled way had been a waste 
of time. Others point out that concepts such as resilience 
and ecosystem services are boundary objects (Brandt and 
Jax 2007; Abson et al. 2014)—that is to say, concepts that 
are rigid enough to maintain identity across sites whilst at 
the same time being sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
local needs (Star and Griesemer 1989), thus better serving 
interdisciplinary ends. Sustainability in itself is frequently 
described as something like a “discursive field” (Caradonna 
2014) in which the lack of a precise and commonly agreed 
upon definition is neither avoidable nor reason to be dismiss-
ive of the notion itself. Thus, determining when concepts do 
require principled definitions and when they do not may well 
be a difficult conceptual problem in its own right, and one 
that philosophers are directly trained to address.
Moreover, it seems that there is a wealth of thick evalua-
tive concepts in the domain of sustainability, in which nor-
mative and descriptive elements are inextricably intertwined 
(Putnam 2002; Williams 1985, cf. Gallie 1956). Questions 
regarding values—as we discuss in the next section—thus 
become unavoidable, despite the fact that they might fall 
beyond the scope of science. Alternatively, concepts may 
play other extra-scientific roles such as motivating sustain-
able behavior rather than explaining it. All these issues nev-
ertheless fall under the heading of conceptual analysis, as we 
understand it, further illustrating the fruitfulness of thinking 
about concepts in a thorough and rigorous way.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, conceptual analysis 
can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of interdiscipli-
nary work. Many of the most basic concepts addressed in 
the literature are basic precisely because of their affordance 
for integration across disciplinary boundaries. The concept 
ecosystem services was proposed to facilitate the integration 
of economics with ecology, for example, and many have had 
high hopes that the concept resilience will make modelling 
frameworks of population ecology available to the social 
sciences (see Abson et al. 2014). Although these concepts 
do serve to identify certain similarities shared by phenomena 
across contexts, there is much more to theoretical and meth-
odological integration than the mere identification of simi-
larities. When these concepts are operationalized in different 
empirical domains it is often hard to determine the explana-
tory value of the similarities they pick out. For instance, 
the concept of resilience has been applied to many different 
types of systems, yielding notions of ecological resilience, 
social-ecological resilience, community resilience, and psy-
chological resilience—to mention just a few (see e.g. Berkes 
et al. 2013; Thorén 2014; Fraccascia et al. 2018). However, 
the causal mechanisms that explain resilience in these 
domains are radically different, hence it is far from clear 
how describing them all as resilient enhances explanatory 
or predictive power. Genuine integration requires detailed 
analysis of the concepts being integrated, which is sufficient 
to connect abstract similarities with the concrete observa-
tions that need to be explained and predicted.
Finally, given the practical focus of sustainability sci-
ence, it is necessary for conceptual work to facilitate the 
application of scientific knowledge, in addition to its pro-
duction. The importance of such applications is evidenced 
in the growing attention given to “green nudges” in recent 
years (Schubert 2017). However, much of this attention is 
focused on ethical value rather than the ways in which sci-
entific knowledge can be applied in executing green nudges 
effectively. Ethical work is not necessarily conceptual in 
the sense emphasized here. Davis et al. (2018), in contrast, 
drawing on the literature concerning the evolution of social 
norms and cooperation, develop the concept of norma-
tive motivation, which they use to argue that interventions 
designed to promote sustainable behavior have overlooked 
a crucial source of motivation. Existing interventions focus 
almost entirely on individuals’ instrumental motivation to 
adopt sustainable behavior—desires based on instrumental 
means for achieving other goals such as reducing taxes or 
avoiding fines. Yet humans also possess an innate and uni-
versal capacity to internalize norms, or to acquire the intrin-
sic motivation to do what is right and to avoid what is wrong, 
regardless of the instrumental costs and benefits. Because 
such motives evolved precisely to perform the function of 
producing costly, prosocial cooperation, they are at the same 
time independent of motives of self-interest and therefore 
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potentially very powerful. Moreover, in that particular nor-
mative motivations are transmitted culturally through social 
learning, they have the potential to spread rapidly and to 
be maintained at equilibrium in populations by the natural 
dynamics of cultural evolution, without requiring govern-
ments to pay the costs of monitoring and regulation. This 
illustrates how conceptual work within the social sciences 
could promote the application of scientific knowledge to the 
practical goals of sustainability.
We thus envisage conceptual work not only as the dis-
ambiguation and refinement of definitions—although this 
is sometimes important—but also as the development of 
new concepts, and the transfer of “old” concepts into “new” 
domains across disciplinary boundaries (experimental phi-
losophers have begun this inquiry, see Robinson et al. 2019). 
This may well require sensitivity to and knowledge of the 
historical development of the science, in addition to famili-
arity with current meanings, uses and applications across a 
variety of contexts. We take such work to be its own form 
of interdisciplinary endeavor, in which methods and skills 
from the humanities are deployed in the service of sustain-
ability science.
Normativity and values in sustainability 
science
No sustainability scientist would assert that the field operates 
independently of values.4 On the contrary, it is, and ought to 
be, replete with value judgements. Wiek et al. (2011) argue 
that sustainability scientists should be trained to be “norma-
tively competent,” to develop interventions that make the 
world a better—more sustainable—place. Normative com-
petence is commonly defined as “the ability to collectively 
map, specify, apply, reconcile, and negotiate sustainability 
values, principles, goals, and targets. This capacity enables, 
first, to collectively assess the (un-)sustainability of current 
and/or future states of social-ecological systems and, sec-
ond, to collectively create and craft sustainability visions 
for these systems. This capacity is based on acquired norma-
tive knowledge including concepts of justice, equity, social-
ecological integrity, and ethics” (Wiek et al. 2011, 209). If 
sustainability scientists are encouraged to become norma-
tively competent, certain value judgments are explicitly and 
systematically integrated into the field even if they disagree 
on the exact nature and role of such judgements in specific 
contexts.
Arguably, value commitments and a strong sense of 
urgency to resolve pressing environmental problems serve 
as the ultimate motivation of most sustainability scientists. 
They insist that values not only guide their decisions about 
which research projects to pursue, but also may legitimately 
influence some scientific inferences. For example, when the 
stakes are high and the consequences of being incorrect are 
severe or catastrophic, it seems that (non-epistemic) ethical 
values should influence (epistemic) decisions about what 
counts as sufficient evidence for accepting scientific claims. 
However, the putative roles of such values in science raise 
serious questions about scientific objectivity (Nelson and 
Vucetich 2012; Mitchell 2009). The standard, value-free 
ideal of science insists that ethical values and justice should 
have no influence over the reasoning of scientists, whose 
concerns should be restricted solely to epistemic values such 
as explanatory power and empirical accuracy, particularly 
when it comes to hypothesis testing (Douglas 2009). In the 
face of these well-documented worries, sustainability sci-
ence will need a compelling story that explains why such 
non-epistemic values are scientifically legitimate.
Consider, for example, the hypothesis that Equilibrium 
Climate Sensitivity (ECS) is between 1.5 and 4.5 ℃. Accept-
ing or rejecting this hypothesis would have significant con-
sequences for practical action and, therefore, one might sup-
pose that the decisions to accept or reject it should depend 
in part on ethical value judgements that concern the wider 
social implications and risks of making an error. This is 
known among philosophers of science as the argument from 
inductive risk, which consists of three propositions: (1) one 
central aim of scientific inference is to decide whether to 
accept or reject hypotheses; (2) decisions about whether to 
accept or reject a scientific hypothesis can have implications 
for practical action, and when this happens, acceptance deci-
sions should depend in part on non-epistemic value judge-
ments about the costs of error; (3) therefore, non-epistemic 
values can legitimately influence scientific inference (Doug-
las 2009; Steel 2015).
In fact, the extent to which science is and ought to be free 
of non-epistemic values is hotly disputed (see Longino 1990; 
Brown 2013; Douglas 2013; Elliott and McKaughan 2014; 
Steel 2015; Winsberg 2018). Without defending a particular 
form of the argument from inductive risk, our point is simply 
to insist that it is crucial for the success of sustainability 
science (1) to justify how some values, including the ethical 
values of sustainability scientists, may legitimately enter into 
science, and (2) to design methods and institutions capable 
of countering the problematic biases that values might pro-
duce (see Longino 1990; Brown 2013; Douglas 2013; Elliott 
and McKaughan 2014; Steel 2015).
4 We follow the standard categorization of values as epistemic and 
non-epistemic in the philosophy of science. The former concerns 
what you value in knowledge (empirical accuracy, generality, etc.); 
the latter concerns everything else. This conventional categorization 
is not meant to implicitly value knowledge more than other things we 
care about, but it is a useful way to organize thoughts when talking 
about values in the context of an enterprise (viz., science) that is fun-
damentally oriented toward epistemic goals.
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Another way in which non-epistemic values enter sus-
tainability science is through the choice of management or 
decision-making models. The growing use of formal deci-
sion-support modelling frameworks (e.g. Bayesian network 
analysis methods; multi-criteria decision analysis methods; 
integrated assessment modelling) (see Benson and Stephen-
son 2018) raises important questions regarding the trade-off 
between epistemic and ethical values (Vezér et al. 2018). 
Although the propagation and standardization of a relatively 
small number of modelling frameworks or templates have 
the methodological advantage of facilitating theoretical work 
and model development (Humphreys 2004; MacLeod and 
Nagatsu 2018), relying on the same set of models could also 
embed assumptions that bias outcomes and undermine reli-
ability (Wimsatt 2007). Analogously, focusing on the same 
set of management models could produce ethical biases, 
implicitly prioritizing some values over others, often for 
epistemic reasons, without sufficient ethical justification. As 
such, decision-making models may face a trade-off between 
epistemic values (such as operationalizability, computability, 
and rigor) and the inclusion of relevant ethical values. Phi-
losophers’ model-focused analysis, as well as case studies 
conducted by science and technology scholars (e.g. Zeiss 
and Van Egmond 2014) could enhance understanding of how 
such trade-offs figure in practice.
Although distinguishing between epistemic and non-
epistemic (including ethical) values may be very difficult 
in concrete cases (Schneider et al. 2019), it has significant 
merit in terms of illuminating different aspects of norma-
tive orientation. An additional challenge related to analytic 
engagement with norms and values concerns the practice 
of sustainability science: given the complex collaborations 
involving diverse experts and multiple stakeholders, values 
are applied in pluralistic ways that may well be implicit and 
mutually conflicting. Although exposing implicit values and 
negotiating among them remains an essential task in sus-
tainability research (Fazey et al. 2018), the last few decades 
have witnessed a proliferation of tailored ethical approaches 
(such as bioethics and indigenous studies), which although 
not always compatible, have often guided the scientific out-
comes of inter- and transdisciplinary collaboration in the 
field. Unlike traditional philosophers of science, who are 
overwhelmingly concerned with keeping illegitimate non-
epistemic values out of science, sustainability scientists 
openly accept them but have not, in general, addressed the 
issue of illegitimate non-epistemic values. In practice, sus-
tainability scientists acknowledge the distinction between 
the variety of non-epistemic values held by the (1) actors or 
stakeholders involved, (2) sustainability scholars and scien-
tists, and (3) on-the-ground decision-makers, although the 
roles of these non-epistemic values in sustainability research 
tend to be discussed only in vague terms (Horcea-Milcu 
et al. 2019). The resulting “messy” ethical frameworks have 
sometimes contributed to unclear scientific outcomes, mak-
ing it difficult to align research approaches and to transfer or 
extrapolate results from case studies to wider research areas 
(Luederitz 2016; Adler et al. 2018). As mentioned above 
with regard to conceptual analysis, dissecting which specific 
values are in play and how values enter into sustainability 
science requires detailed attention to how epistemic and ethi-
cal values are embedded in concrete scientific practices.
Consider, for example, research on sustainable food sys-
tems: there is a highly polarized debate between agricul-
tural intensification, focusing on increased efficiency in food 
production, and agro-ecology, focusing on paradigm change 
in the design and governance of food systems. Although 
both sides are committed to sustainability, their scientific 
approaches diverge because of mutually incompatible sys-
tems of values: increasing efficiency of the current system 
vs. a fundamental re-designing (Clapp 2018). Implicit and 
complex value commitments of this kind are present in the 
day-to-day research of sustainability scientists, and tradi-
tional frameworks of ethical assessment are insufficient in 
terms of exposing them. Making such value commitments 
explicit may require alternative ethical frameworks that 
are specific to sustainability science, with its value-laden 
contexts dominated by complexity and urgency (Whitbeck 
2011; Stojanovic 2019). These frameworks must be able to 
explicate the practical, ethical, and epistemic value judge-
ments embedded in research practices, and suggest ways to 
integrate them in a transparent and accessible way.
Conclusion
Sustainability science is stepping into novel territory in its 
effort to achieve practical scientific outcomes in highly com-
plex and context-rich problem-solving environments. This 
territory is not a complete terra incognita, however, in that 
one can consult various maps developed in the philosophy 
of science and its neighboring fields that have examined a 
wide range of diverse scientific practices, both historical 
and contemporary. In this overview article, we have briefly 
sketched three key areas in which these prior insights may 
contribute to the development of sustainability science. The 
first concerns epistemology and methodology: we illustrate 
how the production of reliable and usable knowledge is sup-
ported by the analysis of (a) inferential strategies such as 
analogical reasoning, (b) new practices such as inter- and 
transdisciplinary research, and (c) social and institutional 
conditions such as science policy that incentivize new 
research practices. The second concerns conceptual issues: 
we illustrate how philosophical analysis can (a) make key 
concepts in sustainability science clear and precise, (b) iden-
tify the functions of necessarily ambiguous and thick evalu-
ative concepts, and (c) develop new concepts that are useful 
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for applying sustainability science to the practical goals of 
sustainability. The third area concerns normative and ethical 
issues, and we highlight the importance of (a) making the 
role of values in scientific inferences explicit and legitimate, 
(b) identifying and untangling tensions between epistemic 
and ethical values, and (c) developing context-specific ethi-
cal frameworks for complex and urgent decision-making.
This sampling of issues reflects the authors’ areas of 
expertise, and it is not meant to be an exhaustive list of ways 
in which the philosophy of science, let alone philosophy in 
general, can contribute to sustainability science. We conclude 
by reflecting on a few options for further developing a phi-
losophy of sustainability science that sustainability scientists 
might recognize as relevant and useful. First, and most obvi-
ously, more philosophers of science should take an interest in 
sustainability science. Specifically, we need to engage more 
with its novel and evolving practices such as ID/TD research, 
experimentation, and action-oriented research with explicit 
ethical commitments, and to develop relevant tools. Second, 
and more subtly, these features should be examined critically 
on epistemic, conceptual and normative grounds, but not as 
anomalies to some idealized scientific method. Philosophers 
of social science tell us that it is more productive to directly 
engage with the unique challenges in studying human behav-
ior, the mind, society and so on than to decide pre-scientifi-
cally whether social science can become a ‘genuine’ science 
like physics (e.g., Guala 2007). Philosophers interested in 
sustainability science should adopt a similar, complementary 
approach (cf. Chang 2004), remaining empirically informed 
about, and participating in, developments in the field. Third, 
this requires more constructive interactions between philoso-
phers and sustainability scientists, including joint research as 
well as critical correspondence.5 We hope that these thoughts 
will stimulate productive interactions between the two com-
munities in the future.
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